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A non-extensional theory of preference, called Sign Theory, is proposed and tested. 
Sign Theory considers preference construction as an evidence-building process, in which 
local valuation of evidence combines additively to form a global judgment. At the heart of 
this treatment is the notion that local evaluation generates positive or negative valuation 
outcomes (signs). Thus, signs are building blocks for preference construction. Study 1 
confirmed the notion that valuation processes are based on signs derived from reference 
points. Studies 2 and 3 demonstrated the robustness and importance of the sign-frequency 
effect, which shows that the attractiveness of an option is positively related to the number 
of the positive signs, but negatively related to the number of negative signs. Studies 4 and 5 
were designed to reduce the sign-frequency effect. Study 4 provided information about 
attribute weights to help participants appreciate the part-whole relationship between 
partitioned attributes and summarized attributes. In Study 5, decision makers were clearly 
informed about the two display formats of the same information. Nevertheless, in both 
studies, the presence of sign-frequency effects remained evident. 
 






 What most distinguishes decision making from other thinking is that it not only 
requires decision makers to have an adequate model of the world but also a model of 
themselves. A decision process starts when one recognizes the need to change one’s present 
state, and culminates when one is able to discern the desirability of the options with respect 
to oneself. Decision-making is, therefore, a value-driven process. One does not always 
know what one wants in life, and probably few ever know this with great certainty. 
Nevertheless, a primary value system typically works well to guide us through daily life. It 
informs us about what to look for, what is significant to us in a complex environment. Thus 
it provides us with decision criteria to narrow the range of information we must consider 
and it promotes real-time responses. The failures of such a system can have devastating 
consequences. An extreme example is illustrated by Dante’s perplexed soul who, unable to 
decide between two equally attractive foods, died of starvation (see Slovic, 1975). Inaction, 
in this case, is not due to the complexity of the task, but to a disconnection between 
problem solvers and their needs. 
 The problem of preference has been simplified in rational models of decision-
making. In Subjective Expected Utility Theory (SEU), for example, all uncertainty is 
loaded into states of the world, and the actors are assumed to have perfect self-knowledge 
regarding their preferences.  The strongest challenge to this conception are the findings that 
violate the logic of extensionality (or invariance), which states that judgments and decisions 
about events with the same extension should not be influenced by the way those events are 
described. However, evidence of framing effects points to the contrary (for example, see 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). One form of the violation of extensionality is the observation 




which the event is described and evaluated. For example, the splitting biases, well 
documented in the application of multi-attribute utility decision theory (MAUT), indicate 
that the sum of the sub-attribute weights is often significantly higher than the weight of the 
summarized attribute (for a review, see Weber, Eisenfuhr, & von Winterfeldt, 1988). In 
terms of experienced utility, the judgment of an affective experience as a whole is found to 
be quite different from the summation of momentary affective experiences across time 
(Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993). There is also a great deal of evidence indicating 
violations of extensionality in probability judgments (Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; 
Tversky & Koehler, 1994).  
 We believe that the common failure of extensionality is an essential feature of 
human judgment. This study proposes that a main cause of such violations is the 
characteristic nature of a primary, affective valuation process. A theory of preference, 
called Sign Theory, is presented here to capture some of the important characteristics in this 
valuation process. In contrast to value-based choice theories, such as Expected Utility 
Theory, there are three key features in Sign Theory: (1) the carrier of value is the actual 
representation (or descriptions) of the object, not the object in abstraction. (2) Evaluation is 
based on classified values (signs), not unclassified values. (3) The choice rule is the 
maximization of signs, not the maximization of unclassified values.    
SIGN THEORY 
 
In line with the interpretation of choice as a constructive process (Slovic, 1995; 
Payne et al., 1999), Sign Theory considers preference construction as an evidence-building 
process, in which local evaluation of evidence combines additively to form a global 




or negative valuation outcomes (signs). Thus, detailed descriptions of an object generate 
more signs, while global descriptions generate fewer signs. Local evaluation is closely 
related to a primary valuation process, which is often affective in its core. Yet the outcomes 
of primary valuation, which guide expressed preferences, are susceptible to contextual 
influences. For instance, Levin et al. (1988) found that people react differently to the same 
package of meat depending on whether it is described as containing 25% fat or as being 
75% lean. From Sign Theory’s perspective, people are consistent in their primary 
valuations regarding the fat information in food, in that they generally react positively to 
fat-free designations, and negatively to descriptions of the presence of fat. Yet for that very 
reason, their expressed preference is influenced by how the % fat information is presented. 
Thus, “preferences” do exist, but not in the sense in which they are conceptualized in 
normative theory (see Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999).  
Sign Theory assumes: (1) that people classify objects of valuation into valuation 
units, and (2) that the valuation outcomes are positive or negative signs, derived from 
classifying information with respect to one’s reference point. Together, (1) and (2) 
represent reference point effects. (3) The attractiveness of an option is positively correlated 
with the number of positive signs, and negatively correlated with the number of negative 
signs. This is called the sign-frequency effect.  
Reference Point Effects 
 
 Let V(.) denote the valuation function of an object. A set of possible outcomes of 
V(.) can then be represented as {1 (positive), 0 (neutral), -1 (negative) }. Note that the 




classified and thus does not carry affective value. There are two implications that can be 
drawn from this formulation: 
First, the easy-to-classify dimensions should receive more weight in a decision than 
the hard-to-classify dimensions. This is because classified information carries affective 
value (meaning), while unclassified information does not. We like (+) or dislike (-) 
someone who matters to us (a significant other); otherwise, we simply feel indifferent (0, 
unclassified information). That is, the absolute value of either 1(classified, +) or –
1(classified, –) is larger than 0 (unclassified, neutral).  
Second, after classification, the sign pattern (positive or negative) induced by the 
introduction of a reference point impacts preference. Thus, although objectively there is 
little difference between winning $1 and losing $1 in terms of one’s overall assets, 
psychologically a win (affective value +1) is better than a loss (affective value -1).  
Reference point effects demonstrate that judgment and choice are not based on an 
“objective” stimulus as it is presented in a decision context (see Chiu & Lin, 2002; 
Kahneman, 1992). Rather, they are often based on “classified” information, which carries 
an affective valuation message (e.g., gain-loss, good-bad). Some suggest that the function 
of the reference point is to simplify information in a complex world (Simon, 1955, 1956). 
Problems of complexity and meaningfulness are hard to disentangle in a decision context, 
and often are two sides of the same coin. But deriving affective meaning from otherwise 
hard-to-evaluate data does not always reduce the complexity of stimuli. Children can well 
appreciate $20 in income from their lemonade stand. Adults, on the other hand, understand 




this case, assessing profit using a reference point (cost) is more complicated than assessing 
it without a reference point, but it is certainly more meaningful. 
The psychological study of attitudes and emotions may provide a broader 
framework for understanding affective valuation processes. Using the semantic differential 
method, Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957) have identified an important factor that 
emerges from factor analysis to determine the affective meaning of an object. This is the 
evaluative factor, so labeled because it includes affective dimensions such as GOOD-BAD, 
and BEAUTIFUL-UGLY. According to Osgood et al. (1957), judgments tend to be most 
strongly determined by the evaluative factor. It is pervasive in judgment and “. . . appears to 
be primary—when asked if she’d like to see the dinosaur in the museum, the young lady 
from Brooklyn first wanted to know, ‘Is it good or bad?’” (p.72)”. Zajonc (1980) also 
considered affective valuation as a primary process, in the sense that it occurs before 
conscious awareness. 
This primary valuation process may be an essential mechanism for an adaptive 
decision maker in the face of complex and uncertain environment (Damasio, 1994; Oatley 
& Johnson-Laird, 1987; Simon, 1967). It determines, in real time, the significance of 
incoming stimuli with respect to one’s concern (reference point). This process therefore can 
be characterized as a quick summary impression, and the gist of it is to disclose the 
affective meaning of the stimuli.  
The Sign-Frequency Effect 
 Assuming that signs are the outcomes of the valuation units, Sign Theory predicts a 
“sign-frequency effect,” whereby the attractiveness of an option is positively related to the 




Let A represent the property to be evaluated. It can represent an object (e.g., a 
computer), the components of the object (e.g., the monitor), the attributes of the component 
(e.g., picture quality of the monitor), or the sub-attributes of the attribute (e.g., color 
fidelity), and so forth. In principle, the evaluation can occur at whatever level of detail is 
presented. Let {a, b, c, …., n} denote a finite set of descriptions (e.g., color fidelity, picture 
clarity, picture contrast) that describe or define the property A at an upper level (e.g., 
picture quality). Let V(A) represent the valuation at the level A, when detailed information 
about A is not given; and let V (A | a, b, c, …., n) denote the valuation at the level A, given 
that lower level descriptions {a, b, c, …., n} are available. For example, in the store, 
computers are often displayed and sold in a “package,” where all the detailed information 
(about the monitor, printer, software, etc) is available. Let V(a) + V (b) +….+V (n) indicate 
that the evaluation is done at sub-attribute level of A, separately for each component, and 
then added up to represent the overall value of A. The sign-frequency effect predicts that,  
Given a set of positive descriptions {a, b, c, .....,n}, then 
V(A)  <  V(a) + V(b)+.......+V(n)            (1) 
  V(A | a, b, c, ....n)  <  V(a) + V(b)+.......+V(n)           (2) 
Given a set of negative descriptions {a, b, c, .....,n}, then 
V(A)  >  V(a) + V(b)+.......+V(n)            (3) 
V(A | a, b, c, ....n)  >  V(a) + V(b)+.......+V(n)           (4) 
 
 Note that, even when the availability of information is equivalent at both ends of the 
equation, there is a difference in terms of the number of valuation units involved (Equations 




evaluate the computer package as a whole, given all the component information that is 
available). Therefore this only creates one Good/Bad valuation outcome. On the other hand, 
there are more valuation units at the right side of equations 2 and 4 and this creates more 
Good/Bad valuations. A notable feature of Sign Theory is that it considers the frequency of 
valuation units, not simply the availability of the details, to be the major determiner of 
judgments and decisions. Therefore, Sign Theory does not predict any specific relationship 
between V(A) and V (A | a, b, c, ….n). Giving a detailed description of an attraction may 
help in some cases, but not always. Having a romantic idea about a vacation in Paris 
without knowing anything about Paris may or may not be more appealing than knowing all 
the specifics. 
 It is important to note that Sign Theory does not suggest that an attribute’s weight 
and its quantity do not play a role in a decision. They may have impact, to some extent, at 
the later stage of a decision process. It is not a contradiction to Sign Theory to consider that 
different attributes, or their signs, carry different weights in a decision. Indeed, given a set 
of attributes, the more important attribute is known to be an important determinant of 
choice (Slovic, 1975; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). However, Sign Theory predicts a 
diminished role for the hard-to-classify quantitative information in a decision, mainly 
because of the difficulty of deriving its affective meaning. A similar concept was expressed 
by Hsee (1996) in his “evaluability hypothesis,” in which he suggested that hard-to-
evaluate attributes tend to receive less weight in judgment.  
The primary valuation is more sensitive to the affective direction of the stimulus 
(sign, + or –) than to its intensity. This is especially evident in the applications of 




Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) found that Toronto residents were willing to pay only a 
little more to clean up all the polluted lakes in Ontario than to clean up polluted lakes in a 
small region of Ontario. When Desvousges et al. (1992) asked people how much they were 
willing to pay to save birds, mean WTP was $80, $78 and $88, respectively, for saving 
2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds annually. A case can be made from these findings that, 
without the benefit of the familiar market price structure, people can only meaningfully 
express their primary affective valuation or moral judgment in sign (positive in these cases), 
and not in intensity. In the language of affect, the loss of ten human lives is a tragic event; 
so is the loss of one human life. It is doubtful if one can meaningfully conclude that the 
former event is 10 times more tragic than the latter. However, from the perspective of Sign 
Theory, the loss of ten human lives in total in ten unrelated events will be considered as ten 
tragedies, and consequently carry more affective value than that of one tragedy that takes 
10 lives. An emotional event, big or small, constitutes one valuation unit. What is important 
is the number of valuation units involved, not their intensity. The prosecutor in Timothy 
McVeigh’s trial apparently followed the same “affective algebra,” when he reminded the 
jurors not to see the Oklahoma City bombing as one tragedy, but 168 separate, individual 
tragedies. 
The effect of splitting valuation units is well documented in the application of 
multi-attribute utility decision theory (MAUT) where the assessment of attribute weights in 
a value tree is an important input for the model. From a prescriptive viewpoint, the 
description of the attribute should not have an influence on its weight (description 
invariance). For example, following MAUT, a larger range of the attribute should result in 




$40,000 to $50,000 has to be given less weight than a range from $40,000 to $80,000. Von 
Nitzsch and Weber (1993) asked participants what range came to their mind when they 
thought about the attribute “earnings per year”. The results clearly indicated that 
participants do not adjust weights accordingly (range effect). A similar bias has been 
discussed under the label of splitting bias. For an additive model, the weight for any 
attribute should be equal to the sum of the weights of the sub-attributes. Weber, Eisenfuhr, 
and von Winterfeldt (1988) asked participants to assign weights to a value tree that 
included the target attribute. Another version of the value tree was generated by splitting 
the target attribute into two sub-attributes, and asking participants to assign weights at the 
level of the sub-attributes. The results indicated that the sum of the sub-attributes weights 




Key assumptions in Sign Theory regarding (1) valuation units, and (2) the sign- 
frequency effect were discussed in previous sections. There were several testable 
hypotheses derived from those two assumptions, and five studies were designed to test 
these hypotheses. They are organized as shown below: 
1. Valuation Units. One of the testable hypotheses derived from the notion of 
reference point effects is that, after classification, the sign pattern (positive or negative) 
induced by the introduction of the reference point predicts an abrupt change of preference 
or judgment (Kahneman, 1992). Study 1 was designed to test this hypothesis.  
2. Studies 2 and 3 were designed to test the prediction of sign-frequency effects and 




frequency effect and the effect of enhanced availability. Study 3 investigated sign-
frequency effects using willingness-to-pay as the response, and contrasted the sign-
frequency effect with the effect of the more important dimension.  
3. Studies 4 and 5 were designed to reduce the sign-frequency effects. In study 4, 
participants were informed of the attribute weights and the weights of sub-attributes. In 




 Study 1 was designed to make both dimensions in the task equally easy to classify, 
thus the overall sign pattern should determine the decision outcomes. Participants were 
asked to choose a secretary based on two pieces of information: the quality and the speed of 
typing, where typing quality was assumed to be a more important dimension as shown by 




Participants in this study were 79 students from the University of Oregon who 
participated to fulfill the requirements for a psychology class. 
Design and Procedures 
 
Participants were instructed to consider four choice tasks (see column 2 in Table 1) 
in a hypothetical hiring decision situation. The instruction was as follows: 
“Imagine the following: You are the owner of a small business firm. You plan to 




in all aspects except for typing ability and speed. You rated each candidate’s typing 
QUALITY and SPEED on an 11 (0-10) point scale, where 0 represents a VERY BAD 
rating, 5 represents AVERAGE, and 10 represents a VERY GOOD rating. In the following, 
you will see the two candidates’ ratings on  typing QUALITY and SPEED. Choose one 
candidate based on this information. Please treat each question independently.” 
An example of the task (pair 1) is as follows: 
                        Quality        Speed    
Candidate A:  8  6   




 In this study, the average rating “5” is assumed to be the reference point participants 
use to classify the rating scores. Therefore, rating scores above 5 will be coded as “+,” and 
rating scores below 5 will be coded as “–” (see column 3 in Table 1). 
Insert Table 1 about here 
Note that, in this study, both dimensions have equally clear reference points (rating 
scale 5). Therefore, signs of both dimensions are important in determining choices. More 
specifically, when the sign patterns are unequal between the two candidates, as in pairs 2 
and 3, the candidate with more positive signs (or fewer negative signs) is predicted to be 
chosen. Second, when the sign patterns are identical for both candidates, as in pairs 1 and 4, 
participants are predicted to choose the candidate who has a better rating on the more 
important dimension (typing quality), consistent with the prominence effect (Tversky, 




Results and Discussion 
 
The choice percentages are presented in the last column in Table 1. 
 As predicted by the important dimension effect, in choice pairs 1 and 4, most 
participants (86% in pair 1, and 84% in pair 4) chose candidate A, who had the better rating 
on typing quality. In pairs 2 and 3, however, most participants chose the candidate who had 
more positive signs (67% chose candidate B in pair 2, and 90% chose candidate A in pair 3).  
It is instructive to compare the results of pair 1 and pair 2. The only difference 
between these two pairs was in the rating of typing speed. Both candidates’ typing speed 
ratings in pair 2 were two points lower than in pair 1. From a normative viewpoint, the 
preference should be the same in both pairs (based on the independence principle). 
However, the results show a strong reversal of preference (86% chose A in pair 1, and 33% 
chose A in pair 2). Similarly, comparing pairs 2 and 3, the typing quality attribute in pair 3 
was two points lower than in pair 2, and the typing speed attribute was two points higher 
than in pair 2. Again, the preference was reversed (33% chose A in pair 2, and 90% chose 
A in pair 3). This abrupt change of preference reflects the change in sign pattern induced by 
the reference point effect. Although typing quality is a more important dimension in this 




 The main purpose of Study 2 was to further examine the influence of the sign-
frequency effect on choice. More specifically, this study sought to test the predicted effects 




hypothesis was also tested, for it predicts V(A) < V(A | a, b, c, ....n) if target attribute A is a 
positive attribute, and predicts V(A) > V(A | a, b, c, ....n) if A is a negative attribute. Sign 




 Participants in this study were 164 students from the University of Oregon who 
participated to fulfill a requirement for a psychology class.  
Design and Materials 
 
 The questionnaire had three between-subject versions: Fifty-five participants 
participated in a Summarized version, fifty-six participants participated in a Detailed 
version, and fifty-three participants participated in a Control version. Each version 
contained eight choice tasks in four different decision contexts (two choice tasks for each 
context): TV, Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), Budget Committee, and Used Car. 
In the choice task, the participant was asked to indicate their preference between two 
options. The information about each option was sometimes presented in summarized format 
without the description of sub-attributes (Control version), sometimes presented in 
summarized format with the description of sub-attributes (Summarized version), and 
sometimes presented in detailed format where attributes were partitioned into individual 
sub-attributes (Detailed version). 
This study manipulated two types of partition, positive (partitioning good attribute) 
and negative (partitioning bad attribute). Table 2 demonstrates the positive partition 




represents an average rating). In the control version, there are no sub-attributes to describe 
the attribute of picture quality. In the summarized version, picture quality, which is 
described by four sub-attributes (picture clarity, color fidelity, picture brightness, picture 
contrast), is summarized into an overall rating of good for TV A and a rating of average for 
TV B. In the detailed version, picture quality is partitioned into its four sub-attributes, and 
they are now symbolized as four good attributes for TV A, and four average attributes for 
TV B. 
The negative partition condition simply reflects the positive partition. As shown in 
Table 3, the control version has no sub-attributes to describe the bad attribute (picture 
quality) for TV A, and average attribute for TV B. In the summarized version, picture 
quality is described by overall ratings on four sub-attributes. In the detailed version, the 
sub-attributes are now split into four bad attributes for TV A, and four average attributes for 
TV B. 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
  Likewise, in the HMO choice question, the attribute Treatment Quality in the 
summarized version was split into three attributes (thoroughness of treatment patients 
receive, how difficult it was to receive care patients believed was necessary, how difficult it 
was to get approval to see a specialist) in the detailed version. In the Budget Committee 
choice, the attribute Social Services was split into four attributes (community center, 
recreation facilities, public library, helping homeless people) in the detailed version. In the 




reliability, electrical system reliability, steering/suspension reliability, exhaust system 
reliability) in the detailed version.  
 In the choice task, participants were asked to indicate their preference on a nine-
point preference scale, where preference ratings 1-4 indicated a choice for option A, 5 
indicated no preference, and 6-9 indicated a choice for option B. After performing the two 
choice tasks (positive and negative partition) in each decision context, participants were 
asked to indicate how familiar they were with that decision context, using a familiarity 
scale ranging from 0 (not at all familiar) to 10 (extremely familiar). The mid-point on the 
scale, 5, was labeled as moderately familiar.  
Overall, each participant answered 8 choice tasks (2 choices X 4 decision contexts) 
and 4 familiarity ratings (1 rating X 4 decision contexts).  
Predictions 
1. (1) From a normative viewpoint, the detailed and summarized versions describe 
the same options. According to Sign Theory, however, the frequency of good or bad 
attributes matters. Therefore, comparing detailed and the summarized versions, the positive 
partition should increase the attractiveness of the detailed version, while the negative 
partition should decrease it. (2) For the detailed and control versions, the sign-frequency 
effect also predicts that, compared to the control version, the positive partition should 
increase the attractiveness of the detailed version, while the negative partition should 
decrease it. (3) Comparing summarized and control versions, the availability hypothesis 
predicts that, because summarized versions have more detailed information (sub-attributes) 
about the target attribute, the summarized version should be more attractive than the control 




version in the negative partition condition. Sign Theory, however, does not predict such an 
effect. Since the number of signs is the same for both summarized and control versions, 
simply making detailed information available should not have an effect on choice. 
 2. This study also examined the possible role of familiarity in relation to sign-
frequency effects. It is reasonable to assume that if one is more familiar with the decision 
context, one is more likely to judge an option by what it “really is,” not how it is presented. 
For example, in the detailed version of the TV task, familiarity may enable one to see that 
picture clarity, color fidelity, picture brightness, and picture contrast are all features of 
picture quality, and therefore one may “re-pack” those features into one attribute and 
evaluate it as one valuation unit. In other words, we may see a reduced sign-frequency 
effect in a more familiar decision context. To determine this at a group level, the results 
from the more familiar decision contexts (TV, Used Car) will be compared with the results 
from less familiar contexts (HMO, Budget Committee).  
Results and Discussion 
Measures of Preference 
 
 The results of the preference data are shown in Table 4, where the preference 
ratings were also translated into choice percentages.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
First, we conducted a two-way ANOVA (Version (detailed, summarized, control) X 
Direction (positive/negative partition)) for each of the four decision contexts. The results 
indicate significant interaction effects between Version and Direction factors at p <.01 level 




factor, separately, at the positive and at the negative partition conditions for four decision 
contexts. The results again show significant interaction effects at p<.01 level across all but 
one condition ( Budget Committee decision at positive partition condition: F(2, 160)=1.96, 
p=.14). These results confirmed the general preference pattern shown in Table 4: As 
compared to Control and Summarized versions, the preference for option A increased in the 
Detailed version of the Positive Partition condition, and the preference for option A 
decreased in the Detailed version of the Negative Partition condition.  
The main predictions in this study were summarized under Predicted Effects in 
Table 4, and the Least Significant Difference (LSD) procedure was used to assess these 
effects. The results will be discussed below. 
Sign-Frequency Effects (D-S), (D-C) 
 
As predicted, comparing detailed and summarized conditions (D-S), the positive 
partition (partitioning the good attribute) increased the attractiveness of option A in each of 
the four contexts, as indicated by the lower ratings and the higher percentage of choices for 
option A. For example, in the left-hand side of Table 4, the mean preference rating for TV 
was 5.0 in the detailed version and 6.8 for the summarized version; the choice percentage 
for TVA was 39% in the detailed version and 22% in the summarized version. Also as 
predicted, the negative partition (partitioning the bad attribute) decreased the attractiveness 
of option A, as indicated by the higher ratings and the lower percentage of choices for 
option A. The LSD tests indicate that the predicted sign-frequency effects were significant 




Likewise, comparing detailed and control conditions (D-C), the sign-frequency 
effects were significant across all but two conditions (HMO task in Positive Partition 
condition, Budget Committee task in Positive Partition condition).  
Availability Effects (S-C) 
 
The results in Table 4 do not support the enhanced availability hypothesis. 
Comparing summarized and control versions (S-C), in general the differences were small 
(differences were significant in only two out of eight conditions). What is more important is 




The manipulation check for the familiarity effect was provided by the familiarity  
scale: The mean familiarity score was 6.7 for the TV context (6.7 for detailed, 6.9 for 
summarized, 6.6 for control version), 6.3 for the Used Car context (6.7 for detailed, 5.9 for 
summarized, 6.4 for control version), 4.2 for the HMO context (4.5 for detailed, 3.9 for 
summarized, 4.2 for control version), and 3.9 for the Budget Committee contexts (4.3 for 
detailed, 3.2 for summarized, 3.3 for control version). There was no evidence to suggest the 
influence of familiarity on the sign-frequency effect. As noted earlier, in both the detailed 
versus summarized comparison (D-S) and the detailed versus control comparison (D-C), 
the sign-frequency effect was found for both more familiar and less familiar decision 
contexts. Further, as shown in Table 4, there were no consistent differences in the sizes of 






 Study 3 differed from Study 2 in three major respects. First, it used a judgment task, 
willingness-to-pay (WTP), instead of choice task. Second, it used a within-subject design, 
therefore allowing a closer examination of the sign-frequency effects at the individual 
participant level. Third, Study 3 contrasted the sign-frequency effect with the “important 
dimension effect”. This effect is well documented in the literature (Slovic, 1975; Tversky, 
Sattath, & Slovic, 1988), and is known to be strong. In a sense, this study pits the impact of 
the important dimension effect versus the sign-frequency effect to gauge the relative 






 Participants in this study were 82 students from the University of Oregon who 
participated to fulfill the requirements for a psychology class.  
Design and Materials 
 
 The decision contexts in this study were the TV and HMO questions from Study 2. 
The questionnaire had three within-subject versions: summarized, detailed, and the 
partitioning of the less important dimension (PLI). The order of the three versions was 
randomized in the booklet.   
In each version, participants were asked to consider each option and then answer 




context, participants were then asked to indicate the relative importance of each attribute in 
determining their judgments by dividing 100 points among all attributes.  
Overall, each booklet contained 24 WTP tasks (4 tasks per decision context (options 
A and B in a positive partition, options A and B in a negative partition) X 2 decision 
contexts (TV, HMO) X 3 versions (summarized, detailed, PLI )) and 6 relative importance 
rating tasks (2 decision contexts (TV, HMO) X 3 versions (summarized, detailed, PLI)). 
Predictions 
 
 As shown in Table 5 (positive partition condition), the sign-frequency effects were 
assessed by comparing summarized and detailed versions (Examples 5.1 and 5.3). The 
important dimension effects were assessed by comparing detailed and PLI versions, as 
demonstrated by Examples 5.1 and 5.2. Notice that both options have the same number of 
good and bad attributes (same sign pattern). The only difference is that in the detailed 
version, the attributes with a good rating (defining features of picture quality) are associated 
with the more important dimension compared to the PLI version, where the good features 
belong to the less important dimension of sound quality. Conversely, in the detailed version, 
the attribute with the bad rating is associated with the less important dimension (sound 
quality) compared to the PLI version’s more important dimension (picture quality). The 
attribute, “ease of operation” is held constant across two versions. Therefore, to the extent 
that there is an effect of the important dimension, WTP responses should be higher for 
Example 5.1 than for Example 5.2. 
 Further, by comparing summarized and PLI versions one can also assess the relative 




Examples 5.3 and 5.4 below illustrate, the summarized version has the advantage of the 
important dimension (good rating in the important dimension, bad rating in the less 
important dimension), while the PLI version has the advantage of sign-frequency (it 
appears to have more positive signs). 
Likewise, for the negative partition condition, various effects are expected to be the 
reflection of those in the positive partition condition. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
 In this study, half of the tasks involved the partitioning of the “average” attribute in 
option B (see Tables 6 and 7). They require further clarification: We expect participants to 
perceive the “average” attribute in Table 6 as a “good” attribute by contrasting it to the two 
bad attributes in the background. In other word, these examples represent a case of the 
positive partition condition. Therefore, TV B is expected to be more attractive in Example 
6.1 than in Example 6.3 (sign-frequency effects). On the other hand, participants should 
view the “average” attribute in Table 7 as a “bad” attribute relative to the two good 
attributes in the background. Therefore, this represents a case of negative partition, where 
option B is expected to be less attractive in Example 7.1 than in Example 7.3. The various 
predicted effects were expected to be weaker in option B (Table 7) than in option A (Table 
6), this is because the good-bad classification in option B is induced by a contrast between 
an average rating and the good-bad ratings in the background, rather than being given 
directly by a good or bad rating. 




 To summarize the predictions: (1) The sign-frequency effects predict that, in the 
positive partition condition, detailed version should have a higher WTP as compared to the 
summarized version. In the negative partition condition, detailed version should have a 
lower WTP as compared to the summarized version. The same, but weaker effects were 
expected for option B.  
(2) The important dimension effects predict that, comparing detailed and PLI versions, 
WTP should be higher for options that feature good attributes in the more important 
dimension (detailed version). And again, the effects should be weaker for option B than for 
option A.  
(3) There is no specific prediction regarding the relative importance of the sign frequency 
versus the important dimension effect. The purpose of this comparison is to use the latter as 
a measuring stick to gauge the magnitude of the sign-frequency effects in this type of 
judgment task. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Willingness-to-Pay 
 
 The results of the WTP responses are summarized in Table 8. The same data set was 
also analyzed at the individual level. The main predictions in this study were summarized 
under Predicted Effects in Table 8, and the LSD procedure was used to assess these effects. 





Sign-Frequency Effects (D-S) 
First, the sign-frequency effects were significant in all conditions. For example, in 
the positive partition condition (partitioning good attributes), the mean WTP for TV A was 
$216 in the detailed version, but only $151 for the same TV in the summarized version. 
This result is also confirmed by the data analysis at the individual level (not shown in Table 
8), where 74% of participants were willing to pay more in the detailed than in the 
summarized version. The results obtained in the negative partition condition were simply 
the reflection of the positive partition condition. Also as expected, the above effects were 
stronger for option A than Option B. For example, in the positive partition condition (see 
D-S in Table 8), the size of the effect in option A was $65 for TV and $66 for HMO, while 
in option B it was $41 for TV and $20 for HMO.  
Important Dimension Effect (D-PLI) 
 
Second, the results summarized in Tables 8 confirmed the important dimension 
effect for both option A and option B. For example, in the positive partition condition, the 
mean WTP for TV A was $216 in the detailed version, but only $170 for the same TV in 
the PLI version. And at the individual level, 58% of participants were willing to pay more 
in the detailed than in the PLI version. With the exception of one data point (TV A vs. TV 
B in negative partition condition), the effects were stronger for option A than for option B. 
For example, in the positive partition condition, the size of the important dimension effect 
in option A was $46 for TV and $53 for HMO, while in option B it was $10 for TV and $14 




Sign-Frequency Effects vs. Important Dimension Effects (PLI-S) 
 
 Third, the results indicated that sign-frequency effects, overall, were at least as 
strong as, if not stronger than the effects of the more important dimension. As shown in 
Table 8, all but one data point suggest that sign-frequency effects were stronger than that of 
the more important dimension, and in two data points the differences were statistically 
significant. 
Ratings of Relative Importance  
 
 The average relative importance ratings are summarized in Table 9. The number 
given in parentheses represents the sum of the partitioned attributes in the detailed version. 
 
Insert Tables 9 about here 
 
 
There were two sources of partition biases shown in Table 9: (1) detailed versus 
summarized versions, where picture quality was split into four components in the TV 
context and treatment quality was split into three components in the HMO context. In the 
detailed version, the sums of the partitioned attributes (as shown in the parentheses, TV 
picture quality: mean=64; HMO treatment quality: mean=65) were consistently higher than 
their respective attribute weight in the summarized version (TV picture quality: mean=45; 
HMO treatment quality: mean=48). (2) PLI versus summarized version, where sound 
quality was split into four components in the TV context and customer service was split 
into three components in the HMO context. Again, the sums of the split attributes in PLI 




results are consistent with the splitting bias reported in the literature (see Weber, Eisenfuhr 
& von Winterfeldt, 1988). 
It is instructive to compare the weights in the summarized version to those in the 
PLI condition. The summarized condition can be seen as the control group to determine the 
“true” weight of the target attribute, that is, before they have been split into sub-attributes. 
Assuming the summarized version does capture what participants “really” believe is 
important, it is quite obvious that simply splitting a less important attribute can alter that 
belief. For example, most people consider picture quality as the most important attribute for 
a TV. In the summarized version, the average weight for picture quality was .45 in this 
study. Yet Table 9 shows that when a less important attribute, sound quality, was split in 
the PLI version, it became the most important attribute (.52). And in the HMO context, the 
most important attribute was treatment quality in the summarized version (.48), yet in the 
PLI version, customer service became the most important attribute (.45). This shift of the 
important dimension provides insight as to why sign-frequency effects are sometimes 
stronger than the effect of the more important dimension. 
STUDY 4 
 
Study 4 attempted to reduce the sign-frequency effects by providing attribute weight 
information for both the summarized and detailed task formats. One way to interpret sign-
frequency effects is that participants fail to appreciate the whole-parts relationship between 
the summarized attribute and partitioned attribute. In this study, we provided participants 
with the information regarding the weights of each attribute and its sub-attributes. The 







 Participants in this study were 290 students from Minghsin University of Science 
and Technology in Taiwan who participated to fulfill the requirements for a psychology 
class.  
Design and Materials 
 
 The questionnaires have four between-subject versions: Two between-subject 
variables are Display Format (Detailed/Summarized) and Attribute Weight Information 
(With/Without). Two hundred and ninety participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
four versions. Two TV choice tasks (positive/negative partition) from the previous studies 
were used in this study.  
In the instruction, all the participants were told that they were to choose between two 
identically priced TVs, and that Consumer Reports Magazine had provided product 
information based on consumer survey: the quality (good-bad) rating of the various 
attributes, which is represented by circle symbols. In the two conditions with attribute 
weight information, participants were further informed about the attribute weights of the 
TVs. They were told that the  attribute weights information were collected from a 
Consumer Survey, and that attribute weights represents consumers’ rating of relative 
importance in their purchasing decisions. But actually, the attribute weights in this study 
were determined by the results from previous studies. In Summarized-With Attribute 
Weight version, the given attribute weights were as follows: Picture Quality (45%), 
Sound Quality (35%), Ease of Operation (20%). In Detailed-With Attribute Weight version, 




brightness (10%), picture contrast (10%), Sound Quality (35%), Ease of Operation 
(20%)). 
 In each version, participants were first asked to indicate their preference on a seven-
points preference scale, where 1-3 represented preference for TV A, 4 represented 
indifference, and 5-7 represented the preference for TV B. After performing the two choice 
tasks (positive and negative partitions), participants were then asked to indicate the relative 
importance of each attribute in determining their choices by dividing 100 points among all 
attributes.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Measures of Preference 
 
 The results of the preference data are summarized in Table 10, where the preference 
scores were also translated into binary choice data.  
Insert Table 10 about here 
A two-way ANOVA was conducted separately for positive and negative partition 
conditions. The results indicated the presence of the sign-frequency effect (F(1, 285)=5.7, p 
< .05 for the positive partition; F( 1, 285)=72.3, p < .01 for the negative partition). However, 
there were no significant effects for the attribute weight manipulation (F(1, 285)=2.8, 
p=.093 for positive partition; F( 1, 285)= .678, p=.411 for negative partition). 
For example, in the positive partition condition, TV A is relatively more preferred 
in detailed format than in the summarized format, with or without attribute weight 




choice percentage of TV A for detailed format. The observed preference pattern reversed in 
the negative partition condition. 
Ratings of Relative Importance  
There was no effect of Attribute Weight manipulation as indicated by the similar 
ratings between With and Without Attribute Weight information conditions. On the other 
hand, the effects of the partition biases were evident: while the relative importance ratings 
in all summarized conditions were almost identical to the weights provided in this study 
(picture quality = .45, sound quality = .35, ease of operation = .20), the sum of the 
partitioned attributes in all detailed conditions deviate from what were provided in this 
study in the predicted direction (With Attribute Weight condition: sum of the sub-attributes 
of picture quality was .65 in positive partition condition and .66 in negative partition 
condition; Without Attribute Weight condition: sum of the sub-attributes of picture quality 
was .68 in positive partition condition and .70 in negative partition condition ).  
The purpose of this study was to inform participants the attribute weights in order to 
help them appreciate the relationship between part-whole representations. The results 
suggest that this manipulation was not effective in reducing the sign-frequency effects. 
STUDY 5 
 
 In Study 5 participants were informed (warned) that the display format of the target 
attribute could be in either “summarized format,” or “detailed format” and later were asked 







One hundred-thirteen students at the University of Oregon participated in this study. 
Participants were paid to complete a one-hour questionnaire, in which the present study was 
embedded.  
Design and Materials 
 
Participants were asked to imagine that “At some universities students must enroll 
in a health plan when they enroll in school. In this task we would like you to choose 
between two HMOs available to students, picking the plan you think will take the best care 
of members like yourself.” The following instructions were designed to inform participants 
about two display formats in the tasks: 
“Some advice: Sometimes an attribute of an HMO is composed of several aspects. 
For example, the attribute Preventive Medical Care is made up of three specific aspects: 
Preventive Medical Care 
Ease of getting immunizations (e.g. flu shots, hepatitis shots) 
Ease of getting screening tests (e.g., cholesterol tests, pap smears) 










Note that HMO A is better than HMO B on all three aspects of preventive care. 
 
Sometimes the information may be summarized as follows: 
Preventive Medical Care 
Ease of getting immunizations (e.g. flu shots, hepatitis shots) 
Ease of getting screening tests (e.g., cholesterol tests, pap smears) 












Again this means that HMO A is above average on all three aspects of preventive 
care and HMO B is below average on all three of these aspects. 
Sometimes people give more weight to an attribute when it is not summarized, as in 
the top example. Try not to do this. Because the information is really the same in the 
summarized and non-summarized displays, you should weight summarized and non-
summarized attributes the same way when making your choice. If the attribute is important, 
then you should give it the same high weight, regardless of whether it is summarized or not. 
If it is not important, give it little weight regardless of whether it is summarized or not.” 
After reading these instructions, participants were given either Choice 1, with HMO 
plans A and B, or Choice 2, again with HMO plans labeled A and B. The plans are shown 
in Tables 11 and 12. Note that each plan is described on three attributes -- customer service, 
preventive medical care, and treatment quality -- and each attribute has three measures. In 
Choice 1 the measures for customer service and preventive medical care are summarized 
into one overall assessment (summarized format). However, treatment quality is left 
partitioned into its three component measures. For Choice 2 (Table 12), the plans are 
essentially the same as the plans in Choice 1, except that customer service is partitioned and 
treatment quality is summarized (detailed format). 
Insert Tables 11 and 12 about here 
Participants indicated their preferred plan using the 7-point preference scale, where 
1-3 represented preference for HMO A, 4 represented no preference, and 5-7 represented 
preference for HMO B. After expressing their preference, participants were asked to divide 




quality) to indicate the relative importance of each attribute in determining the choice they 
had just made. 
Half of the participants did Choice 1 first. Then after completing a few unrelated 
tasks they were given Choice 2. The remaining 45 participants did Choice 2 first and later 
were given Choice 1. 
Predictions 
 
If the “warning” manipulation worked, people’s preferences in Choice 1 and in 
Choice 2 should be the same. However, if it did not work, the sign-frequency effect 
observed in previous studies predicts that HMO A should be more attractive to people in 
Choice 2 than in Choice 1, because there are more positive signs and less negative signs in 
Choice 2. The opposite is predicted for HMO B. In other word, HMO A should be 
relatively more preferred in Choice 2 and HMO B should be relatively more preferred in 
Choice 1. 
Results and Discussion 
The results, shown in Table 13, exhibit strong preference shifts in the direction 
predicted by sign-frequency effects. Eighteen of the 57 participants in Group 1 expressed 
greater preference for HMO A under Choice 2 and 7 actually reversed their preference, 
going from B to A. Few shifted or reversed preferences in the opposite direction. Similarly, 
in Group 2, twenty participants shifted their preference in the direction of Plan B, going 
from Choice 2 to Choice 1, and 12 actually reversed their preference going from A to B. 
Two participants shifted in the opposite direction but none reversed their preference. 




Thus, despite the instruction about two display formats, across both groups (a total 
of 113 participants), 34% shifted their second preference in the direction predicted by sign-
frequency effect, and 17% actually reversed their preference, going from A to B or vice-
versa upon seeing the same pair of plans a few minutes after making their first choice.  
The implications of the choice data indicate that our participants were not weighting 
the measures or attributes consistently from the first choice to the second but, rather, were 
influenced by the number of circles used to describe them. In this light, it is surprising to 
examine the mean subjective weighting factors in Table 14, representing the way that 
participants thought they had used the attributes in the decision they had just made. The 
results in Table 14 show very little variation of subjective weights between Choice 1 and 
Choice 2. 
Insert Table 14 about here 
Recall that in Study 3 and 4, participants were asked to evaluate the weights on the 
partitioned components of the target attribute. Those weights were then added up to 
represent the weight of the target attribute. Thus sign-frequency effects predict the 
consistent preference pattern between participants’ subjective weighting and their choice, 
that is, both reflect the number of positive and negative signs represented in the task. 
However, in Study 5 participants were asked to rate the relative importance at the level of 
three main attributes (treatment quality, preventive medical care, and treatment quality) 
regardless if those attributes were presented in summarized or detailed formats. Thus, the 
sign-frequency effect predicted an inconsistent preference pattern between subjective 




If Table 14 represents the way that participants thought they had used the attributes 
in the decision they had just made, the results show that participants were not aware of the 




Sign Theory assumes: (1) that people classify objects of valuation into valuation 
units, and (2) the outcomes of these valuation units are positive and negative signs, derived 
by classifying information with respect to one’s reference point. (1) and (2) represent 
reference point effects. (3) The attractiveness of an option is positively correlated with the 
number of positive signs, but negatively correlated with the number of negative signs. This 
is called the sign-frequency effect. 
An implication of the reference point effects is that different sign patterns (+ or –) 
of classified information should produce an abrupt change of preference or judgment. This 
implication was investigated and confirmed in Study 1.  
Studies 2 and 3 (as well as a similar study by Lin (1999), in which the attractiveness 
rating was used as measuring scale) examined sign-frequency effects on preferences. 
Altogether, there were four measuring scales used: a preference rating, WTP, attractiveness 
rating, and a rating of relative importance of attributes. The decision context ranged from 
very familiar (e.g., choosing TV) to very unfamiliar (e.g., choosing a health maintenance 
organization, HMO). Also, both between- and within-subject data were collected. Across 
all four measurements and conditions, the results all confirmed the sign-frequency effect, 




Study 3 also found that the sign-frequency effects at least matched and, at times, 
even outweighed, the effect of the more important dimension. The results are consistent 
with findings in Study 1: although typing quality is a more important dimension in 
choosing a secretary, the overall sign pattern, not the more important dimension, appeared 
to dominate the choice. These findings testify to the importance of sign-frequency 
considerations in decision-making processes. In many cases, this tendency can easily lead 
to undesirable decision outcomes. In our TV task, for example, most participants agreed 
that picture quality was the more important dimension, but they were willing to pay more 
for a TV with poorer picture quality than a matched priced TV with better picture quality, 
simply because the former had more detailed descriptions of good sound quality.  
Studies 4 and 5 were designed as attempts to reduce the sign-frequency effect. 
Study 4 provided information of the attribute weights to help participants appreciate the 
whole-part relationship between a summarized and a partitioned attribute. Study 5 provided 
the strongest test of the sign-frequency effect thus far.  Participants were clearly informed 
about the two possible display formats (summarized and detailed) of the same information, 
and then evaluated both formats within a few minutes time. Yet in both studies 4 and 5, the 
presence of sign-frequency effects remained evident. 
The effect of stimulus frequency has been a subject of considerable interest outside 
of mainstream decision research. Such studies may shed light on the issues regarding what 
psychological processes may lead to the frequency effect, and why people are often 
unaware of the influence of frequency information. Hasher and Zacks (1984) reviewed a 
body of research on memory. They suggested that frequency information is “fundamental 




(automatic encoding). Such findings have led many researchers to propose that frequency 
information has a special representational status. Hintzman (1976), for example, suggested 
a multiple trace theory of memory to represent a memory system that establishes a separate 
trace for each attended occurrence. Multiple trace theory proposes a sort of “frequency 
counter” in memory, with which one encodes each encounter separately. Estes (1976a, 
1976b) considered frequency information to be the “basic knowledge” from which one 
derives probability judgments. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) showed that one can 
improve statistically naïve participants’ Bayesian inference by presenting information in a 
frequency format instead of a probability format. From an evolutionary viewpoint, they 
argued that the frequency format corresponds to the sequential way information is acquired 
in the natural environment, from animal foraging to neural networks. In relation to the 
present thesis, there is, indeed an important distinction between frequency and probability 
knowledge. While probability represents a more abstract concept, frequency information 
often represents actual encounters that carry affective value (or experiential value, see 
Epstein, 1994; Slovic et al., 2002). The encounter with an affective-laden event, in 
particular, registers the event, as well as the affective meaning (+ or –) attached to that 
event. A classic demonstration of the automatic encoding of affective information (primary 
valuation) is the “mere exposure effect,” which shows that people prefer certain options for 
no reasons other than they have been frequently exposed (Zajonc, 1968).  
In our studies, the sign-frequency effect mainly concerned what Kahneman et al. 
(1997) termed decision utility. But there is strong evidence indicating that frequency effects 
play a major role in “experienced” utility as well. For example, research on subjective well-




strongly with frequent positive and infrequent negative events than with the intensity of the 
positive events (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 1991). This correspondence between decision 
utility and experience utility raises an interesting possibility that sign-frequency 
considerations in a decision can be rationally based on substantive criteria. 
Prescriptive Implications 
 What have we learned about preference from the present study? At the heart of 
preference construction seems to be a primary valuation process that assigns affective value 
to the target object. This stage of valuation is reasonably stable. Therefore, across different 
situations, one can expect the same negative reaction toward information about fat in a food 
product. On the other hand, expressed preferences are highly susceptible to contextual 
influences. One source of contextual influences that has received a lot of attention is the 
framing. Another is the level of the descriptive detail as examined in our studies..  
 What do these contextual effects, framing and descriptive details, have in common? 
We believe that they reflect an important characteristic of affective valuation, namely that 
the primary valuation process is more sensitive and responsive to the immediate, local 
environment, than to the global situation. For example, people have a tendency to use the 
status quo as a reference point to classify information. Thus, a small loss of $10 is 
perceived as a loss (–), despite a previous gain of $20. In today’s American culture, one’s 
negative reaction to local information about “fat” is almost inevitable. One may be able to 
rectify this primary impression through diligent thinking, but not without effort. From this 
perspective, all decisions start at a “local” level, in the sense that the primary valuation 
process responds to the world as it is presented.  




 An option or alternative can be described in infinite layers of detail. Thus, a target 
object can be judged as a whole, or at the level of attributes, or sub-attributes, and so forth. 
Likewise, in terms of experienced utility, one can summarize and evaluate his/her 
experience at many different layers of detail. For example, the affective experiences of “a 
week’s vacation in Paris” can be evaluated as a whole, or day by day, hour by hour, and so 
forth. Normative theory does not distinguish these different layers of descriptions. A 
standard utilitarian interpretation of an affective episode (e.g., a week’s vacation in Paris) is 
as a collection of momentary experiences summed over time (Parfit, 1984; Schelling, 1984). 
Logically, both a local and a global perspective refer to (or describe) the same affective 
episode. However, as the sign-frequency effect has indicated, the global evaluation of an 
event and the summation of its local components are not psychologically equivalent. What 
perspective one takes at the time of the valuation does matter.  
From a prescriptive viewpoint, the discrepancy that arises from a change in 
perspective poses serious practical and ethical questions regarding how one should provide 
advice to people. For instance, health-care officers often need to prepare a brochure to 
better inform consumers about the pros and cons of available HMOs. Questions regarding 
how much information should be given and how much detail it should be presented have 
drawn much attention in the past (Hibbard, Slovic, & Jewett, 1997; Hibbard, Peters, Slovic, 
Finucane, & Tusler, 2001). In Studies 2, 3, and 5, the HMO question was taken out of an 
actual health plan brochure to simulate the choice situation that consumers actually face. 
These studies showed that people’s expressed preference is contingent upon the level of 
detailed ratings they receive. What level of detail should be given? An expansion of details 




 In the case of framing effects, the change in perspective is due to the shift of the 
reference point and its effect on the sign pattern. Both the HMO example and the vacation 
in Paris example discussed above illustrate the perspective change due to a change in the 
frequency of the valuation units. There is no normative or prescriptive guideline as to 
which perspective will better elicit the “true” preference. A sensible prescriptive 
intervention might be to present different perspectives to decision makers, in the hope that 
this can help people reconcile their inconsistent preferences. A problem with this approach 
is that it may be trying to fix something that is not broken. Recall the “one week vacation in 
Paris” example. In the course of the vacation, one may experience many negative 
experiences and few positive experiences because of various mishaps. After the vacation, 
however, the retrospective evaluation of the whole trip may be positive, because pleasant 
memories stand out while bad memories fade away. To try to reconcile these 
“inconsistencies” is to deny the legitimacy of one’s affective experience.   
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Table 1. Task Stimuli and Choice Percentages in Study 1 
 
 
Pair #  Stimuli * Sign     Predicted Choice Choice %      
 
(1)  A: (8,  6) (+  + )   A      86 
     B: (6,  9) (+  + )        14 
(2)    A: (8, 4) (+  - )        33 
B: (6, 7) (+  +)   B      67 
 (3)  A: (6,  6) (+  + )   A      90 
     B: (4,  9) (-  + )         10 
 (4)  A: (3,  1) (-   - )   A      84 
     B: (1,  4) (-   - )        16 





Table 2. Examples of positive partitioning in Study 2. 
 
Control version  
 Attribute   TV  A   TV  B 
 
 Picture Quality:      
 Sound Quality       
 Ease of Operation      
 
 Summarized version  
 
 Attribute   TV  A   TV  B 
 
 Picture Quality:      
   Picture clarity 
        Color fidelity 
        Picture brightness 
        Picture contrast 
 
 Sound Quality       




 Attribute   TV  A   TV  B 
 
Picture Clarity       
     Color Fidelity       
     Picture Brightness      
     Picture contrast      
 Sound Quality       




Table 3. Examples of negative partition in Study 2. 
 
Control version 
Attribute   TV  A   TV  B 
 
 Picture Quality:      
 Sound Quality       
 Ease of Operation      
 
 Summarized version 
 Attribute   TV  A   TV  B 
 Picture Quality:      
   Picture clarity 
        Color fidelity 
        Picture brightness 
        Picture contrast 
 
 Sound Quality       
 Ease of Operation      
  
Detailed version 
 Attribute   TV  A   TV  B 
Picture Clarity       
     Color Fidelity       
     Picture Brightness      
     Picture contrast      
Sound Quality       




Table 4. Mean Preference Scores and Choice Percentages in Study 2. 
 
 
Positive Partition   Negative Partition  
    Rating    Choice   Rating     Choice 
 
TV   Mean   (A%) (B%)   Mean   (A%) (B%) 
  Control (C)  6.8 17 81   3.8 67 17 
  Summarized (S) 6.2 22 71   4.8 42 31 
  Detailed (D)  5.0 39 54         6.5 11 71     
  Predicted Effects:  
      D – S  -1.2**     1.7** 
      D – C  -1.8***    2.7*** 
      S – C  -0.6     1.0** 
HMO 
  Control (C)  6.0 33 60   4.5 48 23 
  Summarized (S) 6.9 16 82   4.4 49 26 
  Detailed (D)  5.5 38 59         5.4 32 55 
  Predicted Effects: 
      D – S  -1.4**     1.0** 
      D – C  -0.5     0.9* 
      S – C              0.9*               -0.1 
Budget Committee 
  Control (C)  6.0 29 65   4.9 48 46 
  Summarized (S) 6.2 24 69   4.7 55 35 
  Detailed (D)  5.2 45 52         6.2 23 68 
  Predicted Effects: 
      D – S  -1.0     1.5** 
      D – C  -0.8     1.3** 
      S – C              0.2              -0.2 
Used Car 
  Control (C)  4.3 60 37   6.0 21 65 
  Summarized (S) 4.2 62 35   6.0 16 69 
  Detailed (D)  2.7 79 16         7.3  7 89 
Predicted Effects: 
      D – S  -1.5**     1.3** 
      D – C  -1.6**     1.3** 
      S – C  -0.1     0.0 
Note: 1. Lower preference scores represent a preference for option A.  
2.The direction of predicted effects (S-C) was based on the availability hypothesis. 
3. LSD procedure was used to test the Predicted Effects, where * indicates p<.05, 




Table 5.  Examples with Positive Partition in Study 3 
 
Example 5.1   Detailed version   Example 5.2   PLI version 
  
Attribute           TV  A   Attribute   TV  A 
  
 
Picture Clarity      Sound Fidelity   
Color fidelity      Surround Sound Effect  
Picture Brightness     Bass Response   
Picture contrast     Speaker Power   
  
Sound Quality      Picture Quality   
   Sound Fidelity        Picture Clarity 
   Surround Sound Effect       Color Fidelity 
   Bass Response        Picture Brightness 
   Speaker Power        Picture Contrast 
 
Ease of Operation     Ease of Operation   
 
 
Example 5.3   Summarized version   Example 5.4   PLI version 
 
Attribute           TV  A   Attribute   TV  A 
 
Picture Quality:     Sound Fidelity    
   Picture clarity     Surround Sound Effect  
   Color fidelity         Base Response    
   Picture brightness     Speaker Power    
   Picture contrast 
 
Sound Quality      Picture Quality   
   Sound Fidelity        Picture Clarity 
   Surround Sound Effect       Color Fidelity 
   Bass Response        Picture Brightness 
   Speaker Power        Picture Contrast 
 







Table 6. Examples of partitioning average attribute as positive partition in Study 3 
 
Example 6.1  Detailed version   Example 6.2   PLI version 
  
Attribute           TV  B   Attribute   TV  B 
  
 
Picture Clarity      Sound Fidelity   
Color fidelity      Surround Sound Effect  
Picture Brightness     Bass Response   
Picture contrast     Speaker Power   
  
Sound Quality      Picture Quality   
   Sound Fidelity        Picture Clarity 
   Surround Sound Effect       Color Fidelity 
   Bass Response        Picture Brightness 
   Speaker Power        Picture Contrast 
 
Ease of Operation     Ease of Operation   
 
 
Example 6.3    Summarized version   Example 6.4    PLI version 
 
Attribute           TV  B   Attribute   TV  B 
 
Picture Quality:     Sound Fidelity    
   Picture clarity     Surround Sound Effect  
   Color fidelity         Base Response    
   Picture brightness     Speaker Power    
   Picture contrast 
 
Sound Quality      Picture Quality   
   Sound Fidelity        Picture Clarity 
   Surround Sound Effect       Color Fidelity 
   Bass Response        Picture Brightness 
   Speaker Power        Picture Contrast 
 






Table 7. Examples of partitioning average attribute as negative partition in Study 3 
 
Example 7.1    Detailed version   Example 7.2    PLI version 
  
Attribute           TV  B   Attribute   TV  B 
  
 
Picture Clarity      Sound Fidelity   
Color fidelity      Surround Sound Effect  
Picture Brightness     Bass Response   
Picture contrast     Speaker Power   
  
Sound Quality      Picture Quality   
   Sound Fidelity        Picture Clarity 
   Surround Sound Effect       Color Fidelity 
   Bass Response        Picture Brightness 
   Speaker Power        Picture Contrast 
 
Ease of Operation     Ease of Operation   
 
 
Example 7.3   Summarized version   Example 7.4   PLI version 
 
Attribute           TV  B   Attribute   TV  B 
 
Picture Quality:     Sound Fidelity    
   Picture clarity     Surround Sound Effect  
   Color fidelity         Base Response    
   Picture brightness     Speaker Power    
   Picture contrast 
 
Sound Quality      Picture Quality   
   Sound Fidelity        Picture Clarity 
   Surround Sound Effect       Color Fidelity 
   Bass Response        Picture Brightness 
   Speaker Power        Picture Contrast 
 




Table 8. Mean WTP Values 
 
Mean WTP Values in the Positive Partition Condition 
        Option A        Option B 
                                        (Splitting Good Attribute)     (Splitting Average Attribute) 
          TV      HMO                  TV                 HMO      
         
Detailed (D)                    216          202                     115                  81       
Summarized (S)        151          136                       74                  61       
Important D (PLI)              170                149                     105                  67       
 
Predicted Effect          
  Sign-Frequency                  65***           66***                  41***           20*** 
      (D-S) 
  Important Dimension         46***           53***                  10                  14* 
      (D-PLI) 
  Frequency-Important D     19                 13                        31***              6 
      (PLI- S) 
 
 
Mean WTP Values in the Negative Partition Condition 
                             Option A           Option B 
                                       (Splitting Bad Attribute)           (Splitting Average Attribute) 
                       TV     HMO                       TV                HMO      
           
Detailed (D)               118             111                           254               251       
Summarized (S)          195       159                           313               272       
Important D (PLI)                156             153                           303               275       
 
Predicted Effect          
  Sign-Frequency                   77***         48***                       59***           21* 
      (S - D) 
  Important Dimension          38***         42***                       49***           24* 
     (PLI - D) 
  Frequency-Important D       39**            6                               10               - 3 
    (S -PLI) 
Note: 1. Cell entries are WTP in dollars (top three rows) and difference in WTP (bottom 
three rows). 
2. LSD procedure was used to test the Predicted Effects, where * indicate p<.05, **indicate 






Table 9. Mean Ratings of Relative Importance in Study 3 
 
TV: 
                        Picture Quality Sound Quality          Ease of Operation 
Summarized 45 35 20 














                        Treatment Quality Customer Service Preventive Care 
Summarized  48 25 27 
Detailed (65) 17 17 










                                                                  
Note. The number given in parentheses represents the sum of the split attributes in the detailed version. 
 
  
Fidelity     Surround     Bass     Speaker 
    17               13            10           12 
Clarity   Fidelity   Brightness   Contrast 
    26          14             12               11 
Thoroughness     Receive     Approval 
         27                    21               16 
Satisfaction     Choice     Approval 




Table 10. TV Preferences in Study 4 
 
Positive Partition  Negative Partition 
Rating          Choice  Rating          Choice                                                   
                                  
Versions                     Mean    A%    B%  Indifference        Mean    A%     B%   Indifference 
 
With % Information 
  Summarized                      5.26      19       80          1         3.62       47        32        19 
  Detailed                       4.71      30       68          1              5.18       13        75        10 
 
Without % Information 
  Summarized                      4.87      28       70          2         3.55        43        37        18 
  Detailed                       4.34      42       55          3              4.97        15        68        15 
 




Table 11. Choice 1 in Study 5 (Summarized Format). 
 





Ease of making an appointment by phone 
Courtesy of medical office staff 
Helpfulness of medical office staff  
  
Preventive Medical Care 
Ease of getting immunizations (e.g. flu shots, hepatitis shots) 
Ease of getting screening tests (e.g., cholesterol tests, pap smears) 
Ease of getting physical exams  
  
Treatment Quality 
Patients receive thorough treatment 
Patients get to see a specialist when needed 














Table 12. Choice 2 in Study 5 (Detailed Format). 
 





Ease of making an appointment by phone 
Courtesy of medical office staff 









Preventive Medical Care 
Ease of getting immunizations (e.g. flu shots, hepatitis shots) 
Ease of getting screening tests (e.g., cholesterol tests, pap smears) 
Ease of getting physical exams  
  
Treatment Quality 
Patients receive thorough treatment 
Patients get to see a specialist when needed 





Table 13. Choices of Health Plans under Two Different Display Formats 
 
 Group 1:  Choice 1 then Choice 2 
(N = 57) 
Group 2:  Choice 2 then Choice 1 













Choice 1 28.1 68.4 3.5 16.1 76.8 7.1 
Choice 2 36.8 59.6 3.5 37.5 53.6 8.9 
 Choice 1 vs. Choice 2 Choice 2 vs. Choice 1 
 34  participants made same choice 34  participants made same choice 
 18  shifted toward A 20  shifted toward B 
   5  shifted toward B   2  shifted toward A 
   7  preference reversal (from B to A) 12 preference reversal (from A to B) 








4. Mean Importance Weights for Three HMO Attributes 
Group 1  Group 2 
Attribute Choice 1 Choice 2  Choice 2 Choice 1 
Importance of customer service 18.1 17.9  16.5 18.3 
Importance of preventive medical care 30.5 31.9  28.2 29.0 
Importance of treatment quality 51.3 50.2  55.3 52.7 
 
